Who and Why?

From Radical Scotland No. 46 Aug/Sept 1990

The leadership contest for the SNP has opened not so much with a roar as with an apologetic clearing of throats. After all, the SNP is not used to leadership elections, and so the candidates have little to go on as to what the Party will accept as legitimate adversarial cut and thrust.

It has fallen to Mrs Ewing (that is belle-fille Margaret rather than belle-mère Winnie) to introduce a note of friction into the early proceedings. At her launch she declared that 'The party must present a moderate left-of-centre policy profile ... we must never be subsumed in an amalgam of British and Scottish hoodwinking as a Mark II Labour Party or as prisoners of a mock convention'. This was taken to be an oblique attack on Alex Salmond, with the Ewing camp hoping to exploit concern that Salmond's declared left-wing perspective will split the Party, and will make him soft on Labour, including possible future co-operation with the Scottish Constitutional Convention.

The taint of association with the Convention may be of relatively recent origin. But the detestation of those who would (n the eyes of the traditionalist wing which Mrs Ewing represents) seek to disrupt the happy family of those, left and right, who find in the SNP a home for their Scottishness, dates back to the '70s. It was the '79' Group of which Salmond was a prominent member, which turned its face away from Bannockburn rallies and towards industrial disputes like Plessey and Lee Jeans, arguing in the words of Stephen Maxwell, that 'the only nationalism with a serious chance of winning ...' is one which ' ... disregarding romantic concepts of nationhood builds its appeal on an unsentimental view of the social and economic interests of the Scottish people.' For Salmond and others at that time, the task was clear - to provide a radical Scottish alternative to the Labour Party.

Salmond has not been swayed from that analysis, and furthermore argues that the 1980s have seen a development which not only makes such a strategy essential, but also indicates a very real chance of success. He points to opinion polls which show a preference for independence running at close to 40 %, whilst the SNP votes is averaging around 20 %. This, he argues, is 'the fault line in Scottish politics', which did not previously exist. It provides a clear target for the party, who need to conscious that this is the vote the SNP is looking for - the Labour voter who is converted to independence but has had doubts about the SNP. Salmond says this means that the Party must maintain a left-of-centre profile. This is not the same as Mrs Ewing's 'moderate left-of)centre' policies, which by and large have lain gathering dust on the shelves of North Charlotte Street since a previous Chairman, Billy Wolfe, decided that the SNP should have a more clearly defined outline of the social and economic pattern for Scotland's future. Rather he sees the task as one of persuading people that the SNP is a left-of-centre party - which can best be achieved by electing him as its first-ever avowedly left-wing leader. There is no doubt that Salmond does not feel vulnerable to being challenged in this contest on the basis of his socialist outlook. Not only does he feel that his opponent has an inability to grasp the strategic analysis (although he charitably says 'in the hurly burly of Westminster it is easy to lose sight of the real issues'), but he has also the confidence from having stood on such a platform in Banff and Buchan and winning. He points out that Michael Forsyth had warned him of the unpopularity of a poll tax non-payment campaign in the Highlands. With 53 % of the Regional election vote in his area, Salmond claims to have 'laid to rest the idea that you have to sing one song in rural Scotland and another in the central belt'.

Salmond dismisses the concept that his left-wing views will make him soft on the Labour party 'The job of the SNP is to replace the Labour Party as the dominant force in Scottish politics. Our strategic role is to open up the divide between the Labour Party's supporters and its leadership.' He argues that a tough and tender approach must be adopted to take advantage of the schism which will happen when the Labour Party come sunder electoral pressure. The Labour leadership, he asserts, must be isolated for having sold out Scotland and their own principles, but the activists and voters must be given space to support the SNP.

Whilst Salmond appears to be impregnable on the left wing strategy, not least because of his bullish consistency, more doubts have been entertained about his views on the Constitutional Convention. Again, historically, the SNP was split in the early '80s by the fundamentalists who believed in 'Independence nothing less' and the radical pragmatists who were prepared to support further discussion of devolution as a springboard to future independence. Whilst Salmond still welcomes Labour Party debate over which powers to devolve to a Scottish Assembly, he sees this as resulting from the electoral threat posed by a robust SNP. The Convention, he claims, was born as a result of the SNP's success at the Govan by-election, and the extent to which the Convention adopts a radical programme will be determined by the prominence of the SNP's Independence in Europe campaign, which the Convention has to match.

Salmond refuses to be moved by the argument that surely it would be for the good of Scotland, if not for the immediate electoral chances of his party if the SNP contributed to ensuring that the Scottish Parliament had an extensive range of powers. He argues simply that this will anyhow be determined by the Labour Party who in turn will only be influenced by the electoral threat of the SNP which is strongest on its own agenda.

In any case, Salmond argues it would be 'very difficult if not impossible' for the SNP to go into the next election with the Independence in Europe message of the 90s and also to be supporting a convention scheme. (It is difficult to see the logic of this case as in the past the SNP Left was happy to contest elections on an independence ticket but making clear their preference for devolution over the status quo.) Whilst there may be questions as to the intellectual process which has caused Salmond to arrive at this conclusion, there can be little doubt that pragmatically he accepts that for the SNP the convention is a dead duck.

Having seen off the criticism, Salmond is confident of the strengths of his candidacy. 'The left-of-centre consensus in the SNP should be led from that position.' Mrs Ewing, he argues, does not accept the strategy which he has mapped out for the SNP, preferring instead an inappropriate and failed strategy of appealing to Scottishness across the political spectrum. Although Salmond is not prepared to be critical of the personal attributes of his opponent, he does point to his superior grasp of economic issues which he believes will dominate the debates of the 1990s. A further important consideration has to be that of profile, which in Mrs Ewing's case is virtually subterranean. Whilst Salmond is called upon to comment on everything from election results to fishing quotas, Margaret Ewing as SNP Parliamentary Leader rarely appears above media ground. (Salmond's TV performances are so accomplished that one leading political presenter complains about having to interview him because 'he's almost impossible to catch out.')

The strange alliance

In normal circumstances then it should be no contest. But the fly-in-the-ointment is the decision by Jim Sillars to back the Ewing candidacy. Salmond is generous in his appreciation of Sillars, calling him 'the outstanding Scottish political figure of the last 25 years.' Nevertheless, there is no doubting the irritation caused by Sillars backing his opponent - with Salmond believing that if Sillars wishes to influence the party's strategy, then he should have tested his support by standing himself.

Sillars' desperate attempt to prevent Salmond's accession is nothing short of astonishing. Whilst Stephen Maxwell may have provided the intellectual case for left-wing nationalism, Sillars has actually embodied it. In his own writings he has confirmed the need for a left-wing identity for the Party, arguing that 'the question for the SNP is whether it can cast off its old reluctance to admit reality and take sides within Scotland and do so openly in favour of working people'. It is the Ewing dynasty who have been most vociferous in denying this strategy and, as Margaret Ewing has made clear in the launch of her campaign, the old mythology of a seamless, sentimentally united Scotland continues to be at the forefront of her vision.

Commentators have suggested that there have been disagreements over strategy between Sillars and Salmond, although it is difficult to find chapter and verse on this. (Nobody really denies, though, that there has been a considerable personality clash.) On strategy, Sillars has pronounced darkly in the House of Commons, during the Ravenscraig debate, that he has Machiavellian reasons for wishing to see a Labour victory at the next election. There is no mystery about this however. The SNP recognise that Labour may win a narrow majority at the next election and set up an Assembly. The next elections for this will, in Sillar's view, take place at a time of economic crisis which the SNP hope to take advantage of. The revisionist rationale for not taking part in the Convention is that the SNP will, if it achieves a majority in the Assembly, not feel bound by the constraints of the powers agreed by the Convention to be given to the Assembly. In effect the SNP will regard any victory in Assembly elections as a mandate for independence. However, this 'single leap to freedom' scenario - which would appeal most to fundamentalists like Ewing - is nevertheless shared by Salmond, who calls in evidence the experience of the Baltic States where constituted Assemblies ignored the limitations placed upon them once a nationalist majority was achieved.

So far Sillars has not identified any policy differences with Salmond and has explained his backing for Margaret Ewing as being a reflection of her experience in the cauldron of politics of the late '70s and the skills of negotiation which she learned then. Yet Sillars himself has described the performance of the SNP group at the crucial time of the censure debate on the Callaghan government as being 'unhinged' by voting itself into limbo. He is also scathing of the SNP's adherence to purity in the earlier discussion on the Devolution White Paper which he said resulted in rigidity when Scotland's interests called for flexibility and manoeuvre.

But it can be argued that what Sillars wants from Ewing is not this flexibility but the rigidity and knee jerk reaction to Labour shifts ... and he knows he can rely on that. Sillars and Ewing are of a different political generation from Salmond and both share the embittered reaction to the Labour Party of the dog days of the '70s. Sillar's analysis of the political future, which - as with so many of his views, is of the 'apocalypse now' variety - needs there to be no room for manoeuvre: the Scottish people need to be offered a stark choice between the SNP & independence or Labour and economic catastrophe. Salmond, although he subscribes to the strategy, cannot be guaranteed not to exhibit a tendency to re-align if things don't quite go according to plan. Ewing can be relied on not to, simply because her experience makes her incapable of doing anything else.

The Prospects

Sillars has noted that in the 1970s the Scottish people needed 'brilliant leadership - one that would lift them onto a plane of new self-esteem and confidence and give them clarity of vision and thought. A leadership which by its performance would inspire confidence and impart strength.' Perhaps when he wrote those words he had in mind that he could provide such leadership. But he is not standing and the SNP members have to decide whether Salmond or Ewing most fits this job description.

Early indications are that the Ewing camp's assault on Salmond's 'arrogance' and 'domineering personality' are missing the mark, for although he is generally seen as being a bit superior at times, the attacks are way over the top. And the strange alliance behind Ewing is also causing some confusion and some reaction amongst members. Worryingly also for the Ewing combine, the left-wing activists who were summoned to the private meeting in Govan in late May and were told by Sillars and MacAskill to go and persuade the left to vote for Margaret Ewing, are already feeling extremely uncomfortable with this line, and some have indicated that they may well now go the other way. But the most powerful factor which is evident all around the country is that the SNP selectorate are simply basing their judgement on ability - especially ability in front of the microphone and the cameras - and they would appear to be in no doubt as to who will put on the best performance on behalf of the party. Some branches even took their decision before the lists officially closed, and in some cases the voting has been unanimous. Salmond's supporters seem to be better organised on the ground, and a high media profile over the summer should give him a further advantage.

Already, then, Salmond would appear to be on his way to a substantial victory in this leadership contest - a victory which will put him into a very powerful position in the Party, partly because so many of the Party executive lined up behind the losing candidate, and partly because, at 35, he could lead the Party for even longer than the last 3 incumbents (each of whom served for at least 10 years).

But Salmond may be just as delighted by the increased maturity of the Party, which seems set to show that it wants a modern, pragmatic, and politically talented leader rather than just - as in the past - relying on wishful thinking and Put Scotland First slogans. The final shaking off of the old guard may mark a turning point for the SNP, but it will have considerable repercussions for Scottish politics as a whole.